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it is simpler, quicker, market-based, avoids conflicts, and places appropriate discipline on
management.
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and Princeton UniversityI. Introduction
Following the rapid demise of socialism, Eastern European countries
have been grappling with the question of what kind of market economy is best
suited to their future needs.1 Should they incorporate capitalism
whole—sale, and, If so, which kind: American, European, Japanese, or some
new version? How should problems of the transition be handled? What kinds
of institutional structures and laws are most appropriate for their
situation?
This paper is concerned with an aspect of this last question: the
choice of bankruptcy law. The decision facing Eastern European countries on
this question is both important and far from straightforward. It is
generally recognized by economists and lawyers in the West that bankruptcy
law has an important role to play in ensuring a timely resolution of the
problems of insolvent or financially distressed firms and a socially
efficient disposition of such firms' assets. Yet both practitioners and
academics are dissatisfied with current Western procedures, which are
regarded either as favoring the piece-meal liquidation of healthy firms (in
the case of Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, or the receivership system
in the U.K.) or as being administratively very inefficient and costly (in the
case of Chapter 11 reorganizations in the U.S.). Nor is there any consensus
about how to improve these procedures. Thus It is far from obvious that
Eastern European countries should simply pick 'the best available Western
procedure" (whatever that may be).
1lhroughout the paper, "Eastern Europe' will be a short—hand for "Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.In this paper, we propose a new bankruptcy procedure which we believe
avoids some of the main pitfalls of existing procedures. The procedure is a
simple one. First, when a firm goes bankrupt, all of the firm's debts are
cancelled; and an individual -—aJudge, say —-isappointed to supervise the
procedure. The judge has two immediate tasks.(A) He (or she) must solicit
cash and non—cash bids for all or part of the 'new' firm. () He must
allocate rights to the shares in this new firm: each former claim—holder is
either allocated equity In the new company (in the case of senior creditors)
or given an opt ion to buy equity (in the case of junior creditors or
shareholders), according to the amount or priority of his (or her) claim.2
These two tasks could be carried out in parallel, and completed within a
prespecified period of time: e.g. ,threemonths. After this, in the light of
the bids received, there is a further short period (of a month, say) in which
people can exercise (and even trade) their options. Finally, the
shareholders (recall that all claia—holders are now shareholders) vote on
whether to select one of the cash bids or to maintain the company as a going
concern (either under existing management or under some alternative
management team).The firm then exits from bankruptcy.
In essence, our proposed scheme is a decentralized variant on Chapter 7,
in which non—cash (as well as cash) bids are allowed; and ownership of the
firm is homogenized (to all equity),so that the owners can decide (by vote)
which of the bids to accept. What is less essential to our scheme is the
precise mechanism by which equity is allocated; in Section 8 below we present
2The precise allocation scheme ——whichpreserves absolute priority ——is
based on an idea of Lucian Bebchuk (1988).
2some alternative mechanisms for allocating equity which are simpler than
using options.
We believe that this procedure is relatively easy to implement and
avoids the main disadvantages of existing procedures. First, it eliminates
costly bargaining between various creditor groups, and the large legal fees
and expensive use of court time which are the feature of many Chapter 11
proceedings. Second, the mechanism is not biased in favor of maintaining the
firm as a going concern under incumbent management, again as many
commentators feel that Chapter 11 is. In fact, we believe that, in practice,
if an attractive outside offer is made for part or all of the company, it is
likely that shareholders will vote to sell or liquidate the company. Third.
however, the procedure gives claim—holders the option of maintaining the firm
as a going concern if the company's bad fortunes are the result of bad luck
rather than bad management.
It should be noted that our procedure is designed to be effective in
the new post—transition—to—capitalism Eastern Europe, rather than being
concerned directly with the transitional process itself. However, we will
argue in Section 10 that in certain cases it may help to bring about this
transition. Also, while the stimulus for this proposal comes from the
current situation of Eastern European countries, we should emphasize that the
proposal is potentially just as relevant for Western countries which are
trying to improve existing procedures.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we examine the need
for a statutory bankruptcy procedure. Section 3, which may be skipped on
first reading, looks at how existing procedures operate, with particular
3reference to Chapters 7 and 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (amended in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978) and to the 1986 U.K. Insolvency Act. Section
4 sets out a number of desiderata for a bankrupcty procedure, which, it is
argued, are not satisfied by the existing rules. In Section 5, we propose a
new procedure which does meet the goals prescribed In Section 4. Some simple
examples are given in Section 6. We make an assessment of our scheme in
Section 7. Section 8 presents some simpler, alternative mechanisms that
might be used for allocating equity. We discuss In Section 9 certain key
ancilliary issues, such as claims disputes, the treatment of secured
creditors, and the need for debtor—in--possession financing. Section 10
raises some basic questions concerning the feasibility of our scheme in the
current environment of Eastern Europe.In an Appendix, we briefly survey
what is happening now in certain East European countries.
2. The Role of Bankruptcy Procedure
It is generally accepted by lawyers and economists that the state has
an important role in enforcing private contracts. The point Is that while,
ex—ante, parties may find a contractual arrangement mutually beneficial,
ex—post one party may have an incentive to breach. Thus, it is in the
ex—ante interest of all parties that a third party, e.g. the state, has the
power to enforce contractual performance or to compel the breaching party to
compensate the victim by paying money damages.
A debt contract is a particular kind of contract where one party, the
debtor 0, borrows money from another party, the creditor C, and, In return,
promises C a (typically larger) payment in the future.If D defaults (i.e.
4breaches), C has two main remedies at his disposal (outside bankruptcy).
First, in the case of a secured loan. C can seize the assets which serve as
collateral for the loan. Second. in the case of an unsecured loan, C can sue
D and can call on the clerk of the court and others (such as the sheriff) to
enforce the court's judgment. Enforcement of the judgment may involve
foreclosing on real property, physically seizing (or levying upon) personal
property, or requiring some third party (such as an employer) to pay part of
what it owes the debtor directly to the creditor.3
This method of debt collection seems fairly uncontroversial when there
is only a small number of creditors or when the debtor has sufficient assets
to cover his liabilities.4 However, problems arise if there are many
creditors and the debtor's assets are less than his liabilities (i.e. he is
insolvent). Under these conditions, as Jackson (1986) among others has
emphasized, uncoordinated debt collection by the various creditors can be
very costly. First, creditors will expend resources trying to be first to
seize their collateral or to obtain a judgment against the debtor. Second,
this race by creditors to be first may lead to the dismantlement of the
firm's assets, and to a loss of value for all creditors if the firm is worth
more as a whole than as a collection of pieces.
3See p. 2 of Baird and Jackson (1985).
exception should be mentioned. This is where the debtor is an individual
whose wealth would be reduced to close to zero if creditors could seize his
assets. Part of (personal) bankruptcy law is concerned with providing such
individuals with protection from their creditors.In this paper we will be
interested in the debts of firms not individuals and so will not deal with
this issue directly.Given this, it is in the collective interest of creditors ——snd
society too ——thstthe disposition of the debtor's sssets should be csrried
out in sn orderly manner, vis a centralized bsnkruptcy procedure.
Of course, in sn idesl world, there would be no need for the state to
set up its own bankruptcy procedure: individuals could do it by themselves
via a contract. That is, a debtor who borrows from a creditor could specify
as part of the debt contract how his assets will be divided between various
creditors (and the debtor himself) in the event of a default or insolvency,
who will supervise the division process, etc. Writing such contracts is
likely to be very difficult and costly, however, particularly since the
debtor may acquire different types of asaets and new creditors as time
passes, and it may be very hard to specify how the division process should
change as a function of such developments. Moreover, In practice contracts
like this are not written.5 Thus it seems likely that many parties will
choose to take advantage of the bankruptcy mechanism provided by the state;
moreover, even if, by some chance, a substantial number of parties choose to
make their own arrangements, society must still deal with those parties who
make no arrangements at all.6
SQf course, this may partly be because current laws do not allow parties to
opt out of the state's bankruptcy procedure.
6Of course, it does not follow from this that the coats of providing a
bankruptcy mechaniam for firms in financial distress should be paid for out
of general taxation; arguably firms which want to take advantage of such a
mechanism should be forced to pay a fee (presumably before they get Into
financial distress! 1.
63. Existing Bankruptcy Procedure
Having analyzed the rationale for a bankruptcy procedure, we next
discuss how existing bankruptcy procedures operate. (Readers who are
primarily interested in learning about our proposal may wish to turn directly
to Section 4.) In the main, we shall focus our discussion on Western law (in
particular, on U.S. and U.K. law). But in the Appendix we briefly survey
what is happening now in certain of the countries of Eastern Europe; we shall
argue that their actual and proposed new procedures fall foul of the same
criticisms that we level against the present arrangements in the West.
If the only problem with a standard debt collection scheme were that it
led to inefficient "grab" behavior by creditors, then the obvious solution
would be for a trustee or receiver to supervise the sale of the firm's assets
and distribute the proceeds according to the priority of creditors' claims.
This is essentially a description of Chapter 7 in the U.S. code, and of U.K.
bankruptcy law prior to the 1986 Insolvency Act (the 1986 Act allows for
reorganization, but this possibility has not been used very much).7
A widespread concern with a Chapter 7 type proceeding, however, Is that
viable companies will be sold off at a substantial discount in a piece—meal
liquidation. Some law and economics scholars (e.g. Baird (1986)) have argued
that this concern is misplaced because there is nothing to stop someone
7The German bankruptcy code also has the flavor of Chapter 7, in that it
favors liquidation over reorganization. A debtor firm can avoid liquidation
only if at least 35Y. of its creditors can be repaid in cash and the
reorganization plan is approved by 3/4 (in value terms) of the unsecured
creditors. See, for example, Mitchell (1990).
7bidding for the company aa a going concern:if the whole im really worth
more than the parts, then a bid for the whole will dominate a set of
independent bids for the parts. These scholars have gone on to argue that
becauae of this Chapter 7 is indeed the best bankruptcy procedure:it is
simple, it avoids protracted bargaining and litigation, and It leads to an
efficient outcome.
Whiie the argument of these scholars has some merit, the conclusion that
a competitive auction will inevitably lead a firm to be sold to the highest
willingness—to—pay bidder at its (maximized) value is extreme. Auctions work
well if raising cash for bids is easy and there is plenty of competition
among several well—informed bidders. However, even in the most advanced.
Western economies, these conditions will often not be met, and they are even
less likely to be satisfied in Eastern Europe.8
Consider first what we shall call the "financing problem". Imagine
that a huge company like IBM were put on the block. Say that the expected
present value of IBM's earnings is $100 billion. Would any bidder be
prepared to bid this much for the company? The answer to this question might
well be no for two reasons. First, it may be very difficult and costly for a
bidder to raise $100 billion in a short time. Second, even if a few
8One might ask why it matters how much shareholders and creditors receive in
an auction as long as the firm's assets end up in their highest value use.
There are two reasons why shareholder and creditor receipts do matter.
First, the more the firm's claimants receive in bankruptcy states, the more
the firm's claims will sell for initially and the greater the incentive the
firm's founders will have in setting up the firm. Second, In the absence of
a competitive auction, the winning bidder may not be the highest value user
of the firm's assets, i.e. a competitive auction serves an important
screening role in ensuring that the assets are indeed transferred to their
beat use.incredibly rich people, say, could get together and put their hands on $100
billion, making a bid for the company at this price would be very risky.
This is clear if the individuals hold on to the stock themselves since their
portfolios would be undiversified. However, it is also true if they plan to
sell their shares back to the public at a later date. By this time, IBM's
prospects might have changed for the worse and these individuals might suffer
a large capital loss.9
One way to reduce this financing problem is to allow bidders to pay for
the firm in kind, i.e. to offer the firm's old claimants (creditors and
shareholders) securities in the post—bankruptcy firm rather than cash. This
is not allowed for in current Chapter 7, but is a key feature of the
procedure we propose in Section 5.
Of course, few companies are as big as IBM and, for a smaller company,
bidders may be prepared to offer something such closer to the true value of
the company in cash. However, particularly in countries whose capital
markets are still developing, such as those of Eastern Europe, a firm may not
have to be that big for the kinds of imperfections described above to become
10
an issue.
9The costs of financing a cash bid are presumably akin to the costs of a firm
initially going public, which can be significant. For example, Ritter (1987)
investigates two quantifiable components of the costs of going public: direct
expenses and underpricing. From a sample of 1028 firms that were taken
public by investor bankers in the U.S. during 1977—1982, he finds that these
two costs together averaged between 21% and 32% of the realized market value
of the securities issued.
course, it is possible that the piece—meal liquidation value of a company
like IBM exceeds its going concern value. This could happen if IBM is
inefficiently large, but incumbent managment has been unwilling to split up
the company, possibly because it enjoys the perquisites of power. Under
these conditions, a Chapter 7 auction is an extremely efficient way of
9A second reason for doubting the efficiency of a Chapter 7 proceeding
concerns what we shall call the 'absence of competition problem. Imagine
that there are many potential bidders who can raise the funds for a bid.
Preparing a bid is a time—consuming process: the company concerned must be
studied, information must be acquired about how to run it efficiently, the
financial structure for the post—bid firs must be decided on, funds must be
raised, lawyers must be consulted, etc. Thecost of all this activity is
considerable, particularly to the extent that incumbent management is not
available to provide information about the firm's operations (it may be part
of a rival bidding team or not part of any team at all).11
Unfortunately, only one bidder is going to be successful in its bid for
the firm. Thus at most one bidder will recoup its bidding costs ——therest
will make losses. This fact limits the number of bidders who will enter the
bidding process in the first place. In fact in extreme cases it may be an
equilibrium for just one bidder to enter the auction and win with a low
price, with other bidders being deterred from entry by the fact that entry
would cause such a fierce competition that all bidderm would make losses.
realizing value for creditors and shareholders.
1For a compelling discussion of the cost of a bidding process, see Ilurrough
and Helyar (1990) on the RJR Nabisco leveraged buy—out.
12As Shleifer and Vishny (1991) have recently pointed out, both the 'financing
problem" and the "absence of competition problem" are likely to be
exacerbated to the extent that the natural bidders for a bankrupt firm are
other firms in the same industry; these firms may also be suffering financial
distress and may therefore find it hard to raise capital. Their point is
supported by evidence from Section IV of LoPucki and Whitford (1992), who
find that in the forty three largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases between 1979
and 1988, all asset sales were to existing companies, usually within the same
line of business; there were no new companies formed.
10There is another reason why a competitive auction say fail to extract
the full value of the company for security—holders: management (or workers)
can use any specific skiils it has, or special Information It has about how
the firm is or should be run, to extract rents. For example, suppose the
going concern value of the firm is $100 billion, and its piece-meal
liquidation value is $50 billion. Assume that incumbent management is
essential to realize the additional $50 billion in value. Then management.
in cooperation with an investment bank, say, can make an offer for the firm
at (just over) $50 billion, and keep the extra $50 billion for themselves.
This leads to a socially efficient outcome ——thefirm is maintained as a
going concern rather than being liquidated --butshareholders and creditors
between them receive Only the firm's liquidation value. 13
A final theoretical point should be borne in mind when assessing
Chapter 7. In the case of a private company, the Idea that a default or
bankruptcy should trigger a forced sale of assets has some attractions (even
if It is not always optimal): if the assets were not transferred to the
creditors, the debtor would have little incentive to pay his debts. However,
the idea is much less persuasive in the case of a public company. In the
typical U.S. or U.K. —stylepublic company, the group running the company --
management——hasonly a small ownership stake in the company even outside
bankruptcy. Thus, the company is effectively up for sale at all times:
course, one could ask why, if management is so crucial to the firm's
operations, it cannot extract a large part of the surplus outside bankruptcy,
i.e. why the going concern value isnot$50 billion in the first place. One
answer Is that If management paid Itself 1/2 of the firm's value, it would be
subject to law suits by shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.
11someone can take ever the company by making a bid for the firm's shares and
votes. Why then should a new method of putting the firm up for sale -—sn
auction for the firm's assets ——beappropriate in bankruptcy? To put it
slightly differently, If an auction for the firm's assets were such a good
way of realizing value for security—holders, we might expect firms' corporate
charters to dictate that they should be put on the block periodically (every
one, two or five years, say), regardless of whether they have defaulted on
their debts. As far as we know, however, no company is set up in this way,
suggesting that owners of firms are less confident of the efficacy of
auctions than are some scholars.
It is important to realize that the fact that Chapter 7 can lead to a
suboptimal outcome does not by itself prove that it is a bad bankruptcy
aechanisa. After all, if Chapter 7 is inefficient, there is nothing in
principle to atop the interested parties from renegotiating to avoid it. In
fact, this is exactly what we see In pre—bankruptcy work—outs between firms
and their creditors. However, such work—outs fail more often than they
succeed, particularly in the case of public firms with msny creditors.14
Since these firms are also the ones where the 'financing problem discussed
above is likely to be particularly serious, there is some reason to believe
that Chapter 7 is particuiarly inappropriate for large, public companies.
If Chapter 7 cannot be relied on, what are the other possibilities?
145ee, for example, Gilson, John and Lang (1990), who studied a sample of 189
exchange—listed companies that were in severe financial distress during
1978—1987. They find that firms are more likely to restructure their debt
privately if they owe more of their debt to banks, and have fewer creditors.
(Also see Gilson (1991), for an attractive overview.)
12The leading alternative to Chapter 7 in the West is Chapter 11 of the U.S.
bankruptcy code. Chapter 11 is an attempt to encourage the maintenance of
firms as going concerns. The details of the procedure are complicated, but
the basic idea is that there is an autoaatic stay on debt repayments,
creditors are grouped into classes according to the type of claim they have
(secured or unsecured, senior or junior, etc.), shareholders are grouped into
another class, committees or trustees are appointed to represent each class,
and then a process of bargaining among the committees begins to determine how
the firm's value should be divided up between the classes. This process,
which sometimes lasts for a period of years, is supervised by a bankruptcy
judge. During it. incumbent management usually runs the firm, and Incumbent
management is also usually given the exclusive right to make reorganization
proposals for a period of time (120 -180days, but this is often extended).
For a plan to be agreed to, it must in usual circumstances receive approval
by a two-thirds majority in value terms, and a simple majority in number
terms, of each debt class, and a two—thirds majority of equity ——although
under certain circumstances a plan can be forced on a class (the cram—down
provision). Any creditor who can establish that he would receive more in a
Chapter 7 liquidation than in a proposed plan can veto the plan. Note that
there is nothing to stop the firm's security—holders from eventually agreeing
to liquidate the firm; and in fact a significant number of Chapter 11
15
bankruptcies do end up in this way.
15According to Flynn (1989), only 17% of Chapter 11 bankruptcies filed prior
to 1987 resulted in a confirmed plan; and of these, some were liquidation
plans rather than reorganizations. LoPucki (1983) finds a somewhat higher
figure: from a study of the fifty seven Chapter 11 cases filed in the Western
District of Missouri during the first year (1979/1980) of the new Bankruptcy
Code, he concluded that about a third of the firms were still in business
some 2—3 years after bankruptcy.
It appears that for large firms, the picture is quite different. LoPucki and
13There are many well—known problems with Chapter 11. To mention a few:
first, the procedure involves significant legal and administrative costs.16
Second, the procedure can take a great deal of time17 ——notleast because
management has so much de facto power over creditors, and it is not in
management's interest to hasten proceedings if they are likely to end in
liquidation.18 During this time, there can be a serious loss in value ——
Whitford(1991) look at the seventy four largest Chapter 11 reorganizations
filed between 1979 and 1988, and find that around 90'!. of them resulted in
confirmation of a plan. It must be pointed out, though, that there is a
great deal of liquidation under the guise of a "successful reorganization".
Lopucki and Whitford (1992) estimate that on average up to half of the assets
were in fact liquidated in the forty three largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy
cases between 1979 and 1988 ——viz.,thoseworth $100 million or more in
publicly traded securities.
16Perhaps the best available current estimates of these (direct) costs are
those made by Weiss (1990); he found that in a sample of thirty seven New
York and American Stock Exchange firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1979
and 1986, direct costs averaged 3.1% of the book value of debt plus market
value of equity measured at the fiscal year—end prior to the bankruptcy
filing.(See also White (1983), Altman (1984), Eisenberg (1987) and James
(1991).)
Although these direct costs appear low, three points should be borne in mind.
First, ratios of only 3% can actually correspond to very large sums of money,
given the size of the firms. Second, the denominator (pre—bankruptcy value)
may be misleadingly large. Third, and most importantly, these
administrative/legal costs may be only a small part of the overall costs; see
below.
17 .
Flynn(1989) finds that nearly two—thirds of Chapter 11 confirmations occur
in the second and third years after filing. LoPucki and Whitford (1992) find
that the largest bankruptcy cases ($100 million plus) spend an average of
between two and three years in Chapter 11. Gilson, John and Lang (1990)
report a similar figure for 89 exchange—listed companies in Chapter 11
between 1978 and 1987. For much smaller firms, the average period is just
under a year; see Lopucki (1983) and Kerkman (1987).
18LoPucki (1983), from him analysis of (relatively small) Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases in Missouri, concluded that "the debtors studied were almost
invariably able to continue to operate in business as long as they chose to
do so and were able to pay current expenses. Creditors were powerless to end
the debtor's operations.
14because of managerial distraction, incoapetence or negligence; foregone
investment opportunities; or a drop in deaand (either because competitors
behave more aggressively or because customers lose confidenceL19 Also,
suppliers may be unwilling to extend credit.2° Third, since individuals on
shareholder and creditor committees own only a small fraction of the equity
and debt themselves, they are unlikely to devote the socially efficient level
of resources to figuring out what a good reorganization plan is (including
21 what the post—bankruptcy financial structure of the firm should be). Given
that management is already better inforaed, this incentive problem serves
only to tilt the balance of power still further towards management. Fourth,
Weiss (1991), in a study of the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy case, quotes a
creditor lawyer who complained of management's ability to extend the
exclusive period of 120 days in which only it can make reorganization
proposals; "Extending the exclusive period makes it almost impossible to
negotiate with a debtor. The time value of money will bring creditors to
their knees, forcing them to capitulate."
19
A spectacular example of loss in value is provided by Eastern Airlines,
which suffered losses of around $1.6 billion while in Chapter 11 from March
1989 until being finally wound up in January 1991. Weiss (1991) concluded
that "Eastern is a prime example of a bankruptcy gone wrong". Cutler and
Summers (1988), in examining the Texaco Chapter 11 bankruptcy (resulting from
the Texaco—Pennzoil litigation), discovered losses of over $3 billion, which
may be attributable to the costs of financial distress. Other studies of the
(indirect) costs of financial distress include Baldwin and Mason (19B3),
Altman (1984), White (1983) and Wruck (1990).
20Roe (1983), footnote 2, cites the cases of Food Fair Inc., Wickea, and AM
International, in which customers and, particularly, suppliers, refused to
trade with the companies after they had filed for bankruptcy, causing serious
revenue losses.
However, the opposite can be argued; Chapter 11 plays an important role in
facilitating debtor—in—poamession financing, whereby suppliers' credit is
placed ahead of existing senior debt. (For more on debtor—in—possession
financing, see Section 9(iv) below.
21Weiss (1991) argues that in the case of Eastern Airlines, many of the
creditors' representatives had vested interests in maintaining the airline as
a going concern.
15Chapter 11 places considerable discretion in the hands of the judge, who may
misuse it.22 Finally, it should be borne In mind that even an apparently
efficient Chapter 11 proceeding —-onethat is fast and cheap -—mayin fact
be highly Inefficient because the firm may emerge with an Inappropriate
financial structure.23
For all these reasons, Chapter 11 is thought by many to be a wasteful
process, which biases the bargaining against creditors, favors reorganization
rather than liquidation, end is at least in relative terms m soft option for
22Weiss (1991) persuasively argues that the presiding judge in the cmse of
Eastern Airlines was quite determined to maintain the company in business
(despite huge losses incurred while in Chapter 11), and, moreover, to keep
Eastern's CEO, Frank Lorenzo, in control. LoPucki and Whitford (1992,
Section II.C) cite the Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of Johns—Manville and Evans
Products to demonstrate the exercise of judicial power at the extreme.
23For example, suppose it emerged as en all-equity company, under old
management. This could be bad for the disciplining of management both in ex
ante and ex post terms: management has not been penalized for bringing the
firm into bankruptcy in the first place; and, since there is no debt left
outstanding, management is not under any discipline from the threat of future




An alternative to Chapter 11 is to put an administrator in charge of
the firm during the bankruptcy process and give him authority to decide (in
consultation with creditors) which parts of the firm should be sold off and
which parts (if any) maintained as a going concern. This is roughly the way
24Gilson (1989) provides evidence that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy can have
serious consequences for management. In a sample of 381 exchange-listed
firma that experienced extreme stock price declines during the period
1979—1984, he finds that 52% of these firms experience a senior—level
management change (i.e., a change in CEO, President, and/or Chairman of the
Board) during the period of financial distress, as evidenced by a default,
bankruptcy or debt restructuring outside bankruptcy. (He finds that the
corresponding turnover rate when firms are not distressed is only 19%.)
Moreover, even though the average age of departing managers is only 52, none
of them holds a senior management position at another exchange—listed firm
during the next three years. See also Gilson (1990); Gilson and Vetsypens
(1992); LoPucki and Whitford (1992, Section III.B.1); and Betker (1992).
It should be noted that although these figures suggest that Chapter 11
bankruptcy is not a soft option for management, the real comparison should be
between how these managers are treated In Chapter 11 and how they would have
been treated in Chapter 7. In the latter, one can safely presume that far
more of them would have lost their jobs (and far more quickly). So, relative
Chapter lChapter11 may indeed be a soft option.
251n the last few years, "pre-packaged' bankruptcies have emerged as a new
hybrid form. These informal reorganizations -—agreedon before entering
into bankruptcy —-avoidsome of the costs of Chapter 11, but take advantage
of the fact that within Chapter 11 a reorganization plan can be ratified by a
smaller fraction of creditors than would be needed outside bankruptcy.
(Hence a pre—packaged bankruptcy may be easier to implement than a workout.
However, by no means all financially distressed firms can be rescued this
way; as McConnell and Servaes (1991) conclude, "A pre—packaged bankruptcy
is not likely to be useful in resolving complex, litigious disputes among
hundreds of creditor groups with sharply divergent Interests --thekind we
often see in a traditional, highly contentious Chapter 11 reorganization.'
26The Japanese bankruptcy system also has the flavor of Chapter 11.
Reorganization plans are drafted by a trustee appointed by the court; the
court can amend the plan in consultation with the interested parties; for a
plan to be ratified, it must receive 4/5 of secured creditors' approval and
2/3 of unsecured creditor's approval (shareholders cannot veto); If the plan
is not ratified, the company Is liquidated. See, for example, Mitchell
(1990).
17the British system has opermted since 1986.27 This approach avoids many of
the costs of Chapter 11 and is far less likely to be a soft option for
management. However, it puts a huge amount of power in the hands of an
individual (the administrator) who may have little or no background or
expertise in the firm's operations, and who has little financial Incentive to
make the right decisions about the firm's future. The administration system
is sufficiently new that we cannot yet judge Its success in empirical terms.
However, there are certainly theoretical reasons for being skeptical about
it.28
The conclusion of this section is that existing procedures in the West
are far from perfect. The same is true in Eastern Europe (in the Appendix we
briefly look at what is happening now in Hungary and Poland). Thus it seems
desirable to consider alternatives. We will propose a new procedure in
Section 5 below ——havingfirst laid out in Section 4 what we consider to be
the main desiderata of any scheme.
27 . . . Morespecifically, the court issues an administrative order outlining
particular goals to be achieved, and appoints an administrator who takes
control of the firm and, within three months, prepares a reorganization plan.
(The administrator may dispose of any of the fira's assets, including secured
assets.) The firm may also submit its own plan, which can be modified by the
creditors. Ratification of a plan requires approval by at least half (in
value terms) of the claimants. However, under certain circumstances, the
court may bypass a negative vote and proceed with the administrative order at
its own discretion; under other circumstances, a significant creditor can
insist on liquidation. See, for example, Mitchell (1990) and Webb (1991).
28The new French bankruptcy law (enacted in 1985) suffers from a similar kind
of criticism: considerable power is placed in the hands of the court. For
example, the court can accept a reorganization plan without the approval of
creditors (or workers), provided It beat enaurea the maintenance of
employment and the repayment of creditors.(Note of course that these two
objectives may be in conflict!) See, for example, Mitchell (1990).
184. Desiderata for a Bankruptcy Procedure
In the search for a better bankruptcy procedure, it is useful to
recognize that existing procedures are unsatisfactory on two counts. First,
as we have argued in the last section, it is not obvious that they work very
well. Second, it is not clear what their intellectual foundation is. This
is particularly so in the case of the Chapter 11, which consists of a complex
and seemingly arbitrary process for settling the firm's claims and deciding
on its financial structure ——aprocess that is entirely different from
anything ever seen outside bankruptcy. However, It Is also true of Chapter
7, which causes a forced sale of public companies that (in some sense) are
already for sale.
An ideal analysis of bankruptcy would derive optimal bankruptcy
procedure from first principles. Unfortunately, this is an extraordinarily
difficult task, not least because, as noted previously, in a perfect world
there would be no need for a state procedure at all: debtors and creditors
would choose their own bankruptcy procedure as part of an optimal debt
contract. Thus while, in what follows, we will try to provide some
foundations for our proposed bankruptcy procedure, they must be seen as quite
tentative.
A useful starting point is to consider why debt is an important
financial Instrument for firms in the first place.In particular, why can't
all firms raise money by issuing equity? For an Individual or a small
(private) company, the answer Is (roughly) that debt Is a good compromise
between giving Investors voting equity, whIch may provide them with too much
19control over the firm's operations, and non—voting equity, which provides them
with no control at all. With debt, the owner—mmnager retains control over
the firm's operations in non—defmult ststes, but the investor has some
protection: if he doesn' t receive what he wms promised, he can foreclose on
the firm's assets.29
For a large public company, the answer Is a bit more complex, since, as
we have already noted, typicmlly no individual ——orsaall set of individuals
——has(voting) control over such a company. The finance literature has
emphaaized two main advantages of debt over equity. First, interest payments
on debt are tax—deductible at the corporate level (this feature can also be
important for private companies). Second, debt is an important bonding
device.
The basis for the bonding role of debt is the notion that the
management of an all-equity company is under little pressure to run the
company well.If profits and dividends are low, shareholders can complain,
but, because of collective action problems, it is unlikely that they will
take any action (in the absence of a hostile takeover bid, which may be
costly to organize).3°
One way to put pressure on management to run the company well Is to
include debt in the firm's capital structure. The point is that a firm with a
295ee Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore (1989, 1991).
30Hoatile takeovers, when they do occur, generate premia of the order of 3O'%
for the shareholders of target firms (see Jensen and Ruback, 1983). These
premia are consistent with the existence of large amounts of slack in target
firma (and possibly also in non—target firms) prior to the takeover.
20large amount of debt has an incentive to invest wisely and eliminate slack
since, if not, it will go bankrupt ——anevent which is taken to be bad for
incumbent management.31
Note that the leveraging of the company might be carried out either by
an outside Investor who buys up the company, or by incumbent management, who
faces the immediate, but temporary, pressure of a hostile takeover or who
wishes to raise capital from the market on favorable terms. That is, in the
former case, an outsider bonds management; in the latter case, management
bonds itself.
It is clear from the above discussion that, if debt is to be a useful
bonding device, those who are operating the firm (management in the case of a
large, public company) must suffer a significant penalty for non-payment of
debts. In particular, if bankruptcy procedure consisted of cancelling all the
firm's debts and allowing the firm to continue with an all—equity security
structure under existing management (as some people have advocated), then
debt would no longer have any bonding role at all: management would have no
incentive to pay their debts since they have nothing to lose from default.
For similar reasons, a procedure like Chapter 11 which, arguably, biases the
post—bankruptcy outcome in favor of reorganization under existing management
may not be very effective in bonding terms.
Of course, if punishing management were the only issue, then there
would be nothing wrong with a "fluke the firm strategy: any firm that went
31See Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986).
21bankrupt could simply be shut down.In ex-ante terms, such a scheme would be
great since the threat of a disastrous outcome would keep management on its
toes and reduce slack. However, in ex—post terms, the procedure would be
terrible. Given the presence of uncertainty, even well—run firms will
sometimes go bankrupt and it would obviously be very Inefficient to close
them all down. A good bankruptcy procedure is one that balances the ex—ante
and ex—post objectives. To be a little (but only a little) more precise, one
might say that a good bankruptcy procedure is one that maximizes the ex-post
value of the firm's operations subject to the constraint that management is
penalized adequately.
A further issue in assessing a bankruptcy procedure should be
mentioned.It is sometimes argued that penalizing management and/or
equity-holders too much in bankruptcy may be counter-productive since it
causes management of financially distressed firms to delay filing for
bankruptcy, or to 'go for broke", i.e. to engage in risky, but inefficient,
behavior to stave off bankruptcy. People who take this position often go on
to argue in favor of a "soft" procedure like Chapter 11, which treats
management and shareholders relatively well.32
we have noted, although there Is a significant danger that managers will
lose their jobs in Chapter 11, the danger is presumably less than in Chapter
7. Also there is considerable evidence that Chapter 11 does not respect
absolute priority, I.e. shareholders receive soaething even when creditors
are not fully paid ——see,e.g., Franks and Torous (1989); Weiss (1990); and
Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990). This can be attributed partly to the
fact that Chapter 11 gives shareholders veto power over a reorganization plan
(outside cram—down, which is expensIve), and partly because management may
use its bargaining power to favor equity.
22We are not persuaded by this argument for the following reason.If the
state—provided bankruptcy mechanism Is "harsh', it seems relatively easy for
managers and/or security—holders to soften it. That is, if those people
choosing the corporation's financial structure wish to protect managers and
shareholders from the unpleasantness of bankruptcy, they can do so in a
varIety of ways: by choosing a low debt—equity ratio; by bundling debt with
equity so that shareholders receive something in bankruptcy states; or by
issuing debt to managers so that they too receive something in bankruptcy
33
states.
In contrast, it seems much more difficult for security—holders and
managers to harden a soft procedure. Suppose, for example, that the state's
bankruptcy procedure ensures a minimum payoff for managers and shareholders
in bankruptcy (e.g., by not respecting absolute priority), but this is
inefficient for a particular firm. To make it credible that its own managers
and shareholders will be treated badly in bankruptcy states, it will not be
enough for the firm to fine—tune the existing procedure, since any attempt to
impose absolute priority, say, will, by assumption, not be respected by the
courts. Rather it will be necessary for the firm to opt out of existing
bankruptcy procedure altogether.
The costs of doing this are arguably great: apart from the difficulty
of informing all present and future creditors that it is opting out, there is
also the fact that few people may understand the firm's own procedure or know
33Also if a 'harsh" procedure causes management to delay filing for bankruptcy
for too long, then this problem can be mitigated by giving creditors greater
powers to push a firm into bankruptcy on their own accord (e.g. If the firm
has violated some covenant).
23how the courts will interpret it in the event of a dispute; the absence of
case law concerning this procedure will be a particularly serious issue here.
In fact, if the cost of opting out were not large, there would be little
reason for the state to provide a bankruptcy procedure In the first place.
Given this asymmetry ——Itis easier for a firm to soften a hard
mechanism than to harden a soft one ——ourconclusion Is that the state' s
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procedure should err on the hard side rather than the soft one.
We now introduce a procedure which satisfies the criteria for a good
procedure outlined above.It is a compromise between Chapter 7 and Chapter
11, although much simpler than Chapter 11.
5. The Proposed Procedure
At the outset, after the firm has declared (or been pushed Into)
bankruptcy, the firm's debts are cancelled. The firm's creditors do not go
away empty—handed, however; as described in (B) below, they may well become
significant shareholders. What matters is that the firm starts out life in
bankruptcy essentially as a new firm with a clean slate, I.e. as an
all—equity company.
An individual -—ajudge, say ——isappointed to supervise the process.
341t should also be stressed that the procedure which we will introduce in the
next section is in an important sense "softer" on management than Chapter 7,
because management -—alongwith anyone else ——isfree to make a non—cash
bid in our scheme (which they cannot under Chapter 7).
24He has two immediate tasks: (A) soliciting cash and non—cash bids for the new
all—equity firm; and (B) allocating rights to the shares in this new firm.
We anticipate that these tasks could be carried out in paraliel, and
completed within a prespecif led period of time: three months might be
reasonable.
Task (A): Soliciting bids
The judge solicits bids for the firm's assets and proposals for the
firm's continuing operations. That Is, over the three month period,
individuals are encouraged to make cash bids for all or parts of the firm's
operations; and in addition management teams (including the incumbent) are
encouraged to make proposals for how to run the firm as a continuing entity.
In fact, it turns out that in a formal sense there is no real
difference between a bid for the firm and a proposal to run the firm as a
continuing entity, once we allow for non—cash bids. For example, if
incumbent management, say, proposes to maintain the firm as a going concern
with an all—equity financial structure, this is equivalent to their making
the following "bid' for the firm: "We are prepared to buy each share of the
present firm for no cash down and one share in the new (identical) firm.
Similarly, if management wishes to deviate from an all—equity financed
structure for (future) tax or bonding reasons, it can arrange to borrow 8)1 in
the capital market and offer to buy each of the N shares of the present firm
D
for down and one share in the new (levered) firm. Another way for
management to obtain leverage is to offer each shareholder a share and a bond
in the new firm.
25Thus it may be useful to think of the judge simply soliciting a variety
of cash and non—cash bids, rather than a set of bids for the firm's assets on
the one hand and a met of restructuring plans on the other hand.
Task (B): Allocating rights
Before the judge can allocate rights to the shares of the new firm, he
must first determine who the firm's claimants were and what were the aaounts
and priority of their claims. For example, if the firm owed taxes to the
government, is this claia senior or junior to a claia by workers for unpaid
wages or for pension benefits? How do these claims compare in priority to a
claim by a secured or senior debt—holder? Where do trade creditors or future
tort claiaants fit into the picture? If the firm recently borrowed $1000 for
one year at a rate of interest of 10%, but the rate of interest has now
fallen to 5'!,, is this creditor owed $1000 or
These are complicated questions, which have to be answered currently in
both a Chapter ? and a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.35 Since we have nothing new to
say about the answers, we shall simply assume that some procedure is adopted
(possibly exiating U.S. or U.K. procedure) for deteraining the amount and
priority of all claims.
Thus we suppose that the judge's deliberations will lead to the
identification of n classes of creditors who were owed (in total) the amounts
D 0, respectively, with class 1 having the most senior claim, class 2
35See Baird and Jackson (1985) for a good discussion.
26the next most senior claim and so on. The firm's shareholders form the
(n+l)th class, tith a claim junior to all others.
Having identified these classes, the judge can proceed to allocate
rights to shares in the new (all—equity) firm.If the "true value. V say, of
the firm were publicly known (i.e. were verifiable), then it would be easy to
figure out the total amount Si each class I should get based on absolute
priority. The most senior creditors, class 1, should receive the smaller of
the amount they are owed, D1, and the total amount available, V; i.e.
S1 =Min (D1, V).
The next most senior class, class 2, should receive the smaller of the total
amount they are owed, D2, and the total amount available after class 1 has
been paid, V —i.e.,
S2 =Mm
(D2, V—S1).
Class i (1=3 n) should receive the smaller of the total amount they are
owed, D1, and the total amount available after class (i—i) has been paid off;
i.e.
S =Mm
(Di. V-S1-S2-. .. -S1_1).
Finally, the equity—holders should receive anything that is left over; i.e.
S=V-(S+.. .+S). n+1 I n
27Unfortunately, V is typically not known. Howeyer, Bebchuk (1988) has
constructed an ingenious scheme which achieves absolute priority in spite of
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this drawback.
Bebchuk's scheme works as follows; The aost senior class (class 1) is
allocated 100% of the firm's equity (so if an individual creditor in that
class is owed d1, he receives a fraction d1/01 of the firm's shares);
however, the firm has the right to "redeem' this claim (i.e. buy back the
equity) at a price of 0 per 100%, i.e. for the asount this class is owed.
Investors in the next most senior class (class 2) are given the option to buy
equity at a price of per 100%; however, the firm has the right to redees
this claim at the price of 02 per 100%, i.e. for the amount this class is
owed.37 Class 3 investors are given the option to buy equity at a price of
+
02)
per 100% (the total amount owed to classes more senior than it);
however, the firs has the right to redeem this option at the price of 33 per
100%, i.e. for the amount this class is owed. More generally, class i
inveators (2 a I an) have the option to buy equity at a price of +
D2
+
+ per100%. but the firm can redeem this right at the price of
per 100%. Finally, shareholders (class (n+1)) are given the option to buy
equity at a price of + + Dn)per 100%.
36Note that although we propose adopting Bebchuk' a scheme for the particular
purpose of allocating rights in the new all—equity firm, our proposal is
different from his. In his paper, he implicitly assumes that the firm always
reorganizes under existing management; an outcome which we argued above is
very undesirable because it provides no bonding role for debt. As we shall
see, the merit of our scheme is that It combines Bebohuk's reallocation
mechanism with a vote, which may well result in the firs's liquidation.
(There are in fact simpler alternatives to using Bebohuk's scheme ——see
Section 8 below.
371n the next paragraph, we explain when these options, and buy-back rights,
can be exercised.
28Note that we will shortly be giving some examples, in section 6.
This completes the judge's second task, Task (B).
Once the three months are up, the judge reveals the bids, and everyone
can make an assessment of their worth.38 At this point, option—holders are
given some period of time ——afurther month, say —-toexercise their
options. (During this period, there can be trade in equity and options,
although the process does not depend on this.) At the end of this fourth
month, some options will have been exercised and others will not. The firs
(i.e. the judge) uses the receipts from the options exercised to make
redemptions -—startingwith the most senior claimants, and working down the
seniority until the receipts have been used up. These redemptions balance the
options exercised in such a way that exactly 100% of the firs's equity is
allocated at all times.
The final step in the process is that the firm's equity holders vote on
the various proposals and whichever plan commands most support is adopted (in
the election, each shareholder would have votes proportional to the number of
shares in his possession). In effect, there will be three broad choices,
depending on what bids have been received:
38possibiy with the help of some outside expert, such as an investment bank;
see Section 7 below.
29(1) Sell off the firm for cash;
(2) Maintain the firm as a going concern under existing management;
(3) Hire new management to runthefirm.
Once the vote is completed, the firm emerges from the bankruptcy
39
process.
The following time—line summarimes the sequence of events:
Months (approx.)
i
Bankruptcydeclared Bids VoteFirm exits
announced from
bankruptcy All debt cancelled
=>newall—equity firm
(A) Bids solicited Options exercised
(B) Rights allocated Trade in equity
and options?
39Our procedure differs in an important way from the recent bankruptcy
proposal of Bradley and Roaenzweig (1992). They suggest that in the event of
bankruptcy the firm's equity should be transferred to creditors (unless the
equity holders are prepared to buy out the creditors for what is owed), but
they do not diacuaa how this leads to better management (or liquidation) of
the firm. By contrast, in our scheme, the molicitatton of cash and non—caah
bids, together with an automatic vote, provides a mechanics by which
management can be removed.
306. Some Examples
The only part of our proposal that may not be immediately transparent
is Bebchuk's scheme, so it will help to give some simple examples. Let n =
andD1 =100,say; i.e. there is a single class of creditors who were owed
$100 altogether. Assume for simplicity that there are 100 creditors, 100
shareholders and 100 outstanding shares. Then, according to Bebchuk's
scheme, each creditor is initially given 1 share and each shareholder is
given the option to buy 1 share at the price of $1 each.
Suppose first that, on the basis of the bids announced by the judge,
the firm is generally perceived to be worth more than $100. Then each
shareholder will choose to exercise his option to buy a share for $1. The
judge receives $100, which he uses to redeem all the creditors' shares. Thus
creditors' debts are fully paid and initial shareholders end up with all the
equity.
Next, suppose the firm is generally perceived to be worth less than
$100. Then no shareholder chooses to exercise his option.In this case, the
creditors end up as shareholders, and the initial shareholders neither pay
nor receive anything.
Consider finally an intermediate case where twenty shareholders, say.
think the firm is worth more than $100 and exercise their options and eighty
do not.(We ignore the possibility that the twenty optimists purchase the
options of the eighty pessimists.) Then the judge uses the $20 he receives
to buy back 20% of each creditor's shareholdings, and transfers the 20 shares
purchased to those exercising the options.
31To take a slightly more complicated example, let n =2and=100,D2
= 200;i.e. there are two classes of creditors who were owed $100 and $200,
respectively. Let there be 100 people in each class, and also 100
shareholders and 100 shares of the firm outstanding. Then the first class of
creditors is given 1 share each, each member of the second class Is given the
option to buy 1 share for $1, and each shareholder Is given the option to buy
a share for $3.
Suppose that, on the basis of the bids announced by the judge, the firm
is generally perceived to be worth more than $300, so that each shareholder
chooses to exercise his option to buy a share for $3. Then the judge takes
their $300 and uses it to redeem the senior creditors' rights (for $1 a
piece) and the junIor creditors' rights (for $2 a piece). He then transfers
the shares obtained to the initial shareholders. Thus at the end of the
process, all the equity is in the original shareholders' hands and all the
creditors have been fully paid off.
On the other hand, suppose the firm is generally perceived to be worth
between $100 and $300. Then no shareholders will exercise their options, but
all junior creditors will exercise theirs. The judge takes the receipts of
$100 and uses it to redeem the senior creditors' rights for $1 each,
transferring their shares to the junior creditors. At the end of the
process, all the equity is in the junior creditors' hands and all the senior
creditors have been fully paid off. The shareholders neither pay nor receive
anything.
32As a third case, suppose that everyone thinks that the firm is worth
less than $300, but half of the junior creditors think that it's worth more
than $100 and half less. Then half of the junior creditors will choose to
exercise their rights, but no shareholders will (we again ignore the
possibility of trading in optiona). The judge will use the $50 received to
redeem half of the aenior creditors' rights. At the end of the process, half
of the equity will be in junior creditors' hands and half in senior
40 creditors hands.
It should be clear from these examples that Bebchuk's scheme preserves
absolute priority in the following sense. If class 1 creditors (1 5ia n)
are fully paid off, then this must mean that some lower class exercised their
options. But then all creditors senior to class i are also fully paid off.
In addition, the scheme has the desirable property that nobody can
really "complain1' about their allocation, at least if capital markets
function reasonably well. If a class i creditor's option is not redeemed
(i.e. he is not fully paid), where 2 a i Sn,then he always has the option
to buy a share in the firm himself at the price of (D1 +... + 0ilper
100%. If he does not do mo, it must be either because he thinkm the firm is
worth less than (Dl +. . . + D.1),in which case according to the absolute
priority rule he is entitled to nothing anywsy; or because he does not have
enough camh to exercise the option. In the latter case, however, (at least
400ne can extend this example to consider cases where some (but not all)
shareholders think that the firm is worth more than $300 and exercise their
options, and some (but not all) junior creditors think that the firm is worth
more than $100 and exercise their options. These cases are a little more
complex, but the procedure works in basically the smme way. The reader is
referred to Bebchuk (l98B) for details.
33if capital markets are well—functioning), he ought to be able to sell the
option on favorable terms unless the firm is generally perceived by the
market to be worth less than (D1 +... + D11);this possibility is examined
further in Section 8.
7. An Assessment
In assessing our proposal, It first may be helpful to make clear what
we consider are its essential ingredients. The scheme can be viewed as a
variant on Chapter 7, in which
(a) non—cash (as well as cash) bids are allowed; and
(b) ownership of the firm is homogenized (to all equity),
so that
(c) the owners can decide (by vote) which of the (heterogeneous)
bids to accept.
Notice that the scheme is quite decentralized: no discretion Is left in the
handsof,say, a Judge/trustee/expert, or of a committee f representatives.4'
What is less essential to our scheme is the precise mechanism by which
equity is allocated. We have proposed adopting Bebchuk's mechanism because
it has the advantage of preserving absolute priority. But there are other,
simpler, mechanisms that might be used ——seeSection S below.
41Except, of course, for the crucial role of the bankruptcy Judge in deciding
who is owed what, and the relative seniorities of these claims.
34It is worth spelling out how our proposal overcomes some of the
problems with Chapter 7 noted in Section 3. The principal advantage of our
proposal is that, by permitting non—cash bids, it reduces (or even
eliminates) what we called the financing problem. The reason is that a
bidder who is cash—constrained or does not want to bear the risk of holding a
large fraction of the company shares himself, even in the short—term, can
offer shares (and/or bonds) in the new company directly to the old claimants.
In other words, our procedure takes advantage of the fact that the firm's old
claimants may be the most natural group to hold securities in ——orto put it
another way, to be risk—bearers for ——thenew firm.In contrast, Chapter 7
introduces an extra stage in the transaction: the bidder must first raise
cash from the market and then, possibly through a public offering, find
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individual Investors with whom to share risks.
420f course, although it is true that the old claimants may be the most
natural providers of capital for the new company, it does not follow that
they will all want to hold the same ypg of claims. We would argue,
however, that there is no strong reason to think that a former, small public
bond holder will be significantly less willing to hold equity in the new
company than debt in the old company.
The same is not necessarily true of large claimants. For example, one of the
firm's previous creditors might be a large bank, which has a comparative
advantage in monitoring the lower tail of the firm's cash earnings, or which
for some other reason does not wish to bear too much risk. It may be very
Inefficient for this creditor to be allocated a large amount of equity in the
new company. There is a simple way round this problem, however. Management
could propose a reorganization plan in which the bank becomes a large
creditor of the firm after it emerges from bankruptcy, in return for selling
back its equity to the firm. The only difficulty with this is that it can
raise a conflict of interest: the bank, as a former creditor, will be able
to vote on a deal from which it may well be benefitting substantially. We
discuss ways of dealing with this kind of conflict in Section 9(u)below.
35Note that although non—cash bids mitigate the financing problem", they
do not directly affect the lack of competition problem. It is still true
that parties may be deterred from bidding for the company given that they may
not recover the sunk costs of making a bid, and also that a management team
can use its specific skills or knowledge to extract some of the rents from
the auction. However, non—cash bids are likely to help indirectly simply by
making it easier for cash—constrained, risk averse parties to bid. This is
likely to raise the number of eventual bidders, and therefore also to
increase the competitiveness of the auction and the value of the winning bid
to claimants.
Some people might question why it is necessary, following a bankruptcy,
to put the firm up for auction (that is, why bids should be solicited and a
vote taken). Why not simply let the firm emerge with an all—equity
structure, and allow those who want to buy the firm to do so by making a
take—over bid? The answer is that there mre good reasons for doubting the
efficiency of the takeover mechanism. As has been analyzed at length in the
literature (see, for example, Grossman and Hart, 1980), a bidder must share a
considerable fraction of his takeover gains with free—riding minority
shareholders, or with competing bidders. In addition, management can often
thwart a bidder either by engaging in various defensive measures (law suits.
poison pills, ESOP's etc.) or, at the last moment, by carrying out the
actions the bidder was planning to. Finally, management can finance much of
its resistance using shareholder money.
The scheme we have proposed is quite different in nature from a
takeover. No free—riding by shareholders is possible; management cannot
undertake defensive measures or react to what outside bidders propose; and
36management cannot use corporate resources to stay in power. In other words,
in contrast to a take—over playing field which is (perhaps with reason)
tilted in favor of aanageaent, the bankruptcy playing field that we have
advocated is at most flat, and, we suspect, sore typica1ly, tilted in favor
of outsiders (see below).
Our proposal might be criticized on the grounds that shareholders may
not have the knowledge or incentive to vote for the best offer.It is one
thing for (possibly quite dispersed) shareholders to vote among cash offers
for the firm (presumably they will all choose the largest); it is quite
another to expect them to decide between a cash offer and a non—cash offer.
To reduce this problem, it may be useful for the Judge to hire an agent like
an investment bank to value the various proposals. (Someone also needs to
check whether the financing for each proposal is secure.) The investment
bank's fees might be paid out of the firm's future receipts (i.e. the fire
would start off life with some (senior) debt outstanding to the investment
bank) or by giving the bank some equity in the new firm (in which case the
bank would presumably also get to vote on the various proposals it has
vetted).
Note also that the fact that shareholders have difficulty assessing
non—cash bids may simply mean that they will vote for a cash bid. This is
not a disaster: for the purpose of convincing earlier investors that
management will endeavour to avoid bsnkruptcy, it is a useful bonding device
that, in the event of bankrupcty, management will (probably) be voted out
office. Also, in many cases it say be efficient for the firs to be sold off,
and, even if it is Inefficient, it will often not be grossly so.
37Our main concern is that the ftrm should be reorganized when this is a
clearly superior alternattve ——e.g.,becausethe bankruptcy is clearly due
to events outside management's control. Our feeling is that in such
clear—cut situations even a relatively uninformed shareholder should be able
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to make the right choice.
S. Simpler methods of allocating equity
We have advocated using Eebchuk's relatively sophisticated —-although
conceptually not at all difficult ——mechanismfor allocating equity. Some
people may argue that this mechanism is too complicated for practical
purposes, and that a simpler scheme should be found.
A useful way to explore this matter further is to begin by considering
what would happen in Eebchuk's mechanism if junior claimants (either junior
creditors or shareholders) are cash constrained ——sothat they are unable to
exercise their options when they perceive that the firm is valuable, and the
market for options is sufficiently underdeveloped that they cannot easily
43The process of comparing bids (non—cash) that we hsve advocated is not
completely unfamiliar in the corporate context. Firms which are undergoing
leveraged buy—outs face something similar. There the incumbent management
team typically makes a bid to take the firs private. Other groups often show
an interest too, and a subset of the board's disinterested (or independent)
directors is charged with conducting an auction. At the end of this auction
the disinterested directors will approve one of the bids or decide that the
status quo is better for shareholders (i.e. the company should remain
public). See Eurrough and Helyar (1990) for a fascinating account of this
process.
The major difference between the LEO process and the one advocated here is
that, in the LEO case, the bids are decided on by shareholder
representatives, while in our case they are decided on by the shareholders
directly. (Even in an LEO case, a decision to take the company private would
have to be ratified by shareholders.
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sell them.
At first glance, this may not appear to be s serious problem. For
instance, if a junior security holder (say, an old equity holder) has the
option to buy equity at a price below what he considers it is worth, but does
not have the cash on hand to do so, then he could always borrow short—term,
offering the equity as collateral for the loan, and then sell the equity (at
a profit) once the firm emerges from bankruptcy. However this argument
overlooks the fact that his perception of the future value of the firm's
equity may not be shared by his potential creditors; if they mre less
optimistic than he is, and he cannot offer them anything else by way of
collateral, then he will not be able to borrow the cash needed to exercise
his option.
But does it matter if options cannot be exercised? The net effect of a
failure in the options "market" is to leave more equity in the hands of
senior creditors than is warranted by the face value of their debt.
Arguably, this redistribution of the firm's value (disproportionately into
the hands of senior creditors) does not matter since claims have still been
homogenized so as to remove the scope for ex post bargaining, and the new
equity holders (mainly comprising the old senior creditors) ihould therefore
still vote for the best bid. Of course, there would appear to be some
unfairness. But in principle this potential transfer of wealth from junior
to senior claimants would be priced in the ex ante securities markets anywsy;
so the "unfairness" is more apparent than real.
44'rhis is likely to be a particular problea in Eastern Europe.
39This is an intriguing argument, because it raises the larger question:
why should one bother using Hebchuk's mechanism, when an even simpler rule
could be used? Here are some possible alternatives:
(1) Once the bids (both cash and non—cash) have been assembled, one or
more outside investment banks could be employed to assess them and to
estimate the value, e say, of the best one. Shares could then be
allocated according to absolute priority, taking Vtm asif it were the
true value of the firm (i.e., as in Chapter 7, except that it is
equity, not cash, that is being distributed). Shareholders would then
vote to choose what they consider to be the best bid, just as in
Section 5 above.
(2) As in (1), except that the highest cash bid, c say --whichis an
objective amount ——isused in lieu of e as a basis for distributing
equity.
(3) Equity might be allocated in proportion to the face value of claims ——
with,say, xY., reserved for old equity holders, where x 50is some
prespecified number.
(4) An even cruder rule than (3) would be to allocate all the equity to
senior creditors, regardless of the face value of their claims (indeed
this would be the outcome of our proposed scheme in the extreme
case where no options were exercised because of cash contraints).
40These four alternative rules still meet the basic requirements of our
proposal: first, non—cash as well as cash bids are allowed, so that
reorganization is given a fair chance; second, a homogeneous group of new
equity—holders is created, who get to vote on the future of the firm; and
third, the old management faces the discipline of having to bid to keep their
jobs. The sense in which these simple rules are inferior to our proposed
scheme is that they may fail to preserve absolute priority: they typically
give either too much or too little to Junior claimants relative to senior.
[In (1), for example, V5 may overestimate the true value, V, of the firm; In
which case junior claimants receive too much. In (2), V' may be well below
the value, V, of the best non—cash bid; in which case Junior claimants
receive too little. IIfcash constraints are not a problem, the strength of
the Bebchuk scheme is that it is a market-based mechanism which preserves
absolute priority. But if one suspects that in practice the scheme would not
work (and hence fail to respect absolute priority), then it may be better to
opt for something simpler, along the lines of one of the above
45,46 alternatives.
45Even If one were to opt for one of the alternative rules (1)—(4), there
would be strong argument for supplementing It with Bebchuk options: that is,
class 2 creditors could be given the right to buy out the most senior (class
1) creditors at price D1; class 3 could be given the right to buy out both
classes 1 and 2 at price D1 +
112;etc. This would at least give some power
of redress to aggrieved individual junior claimants who feel that senior
claimants are getting more than they are owed.
46Readers may wonder why the preservation of absolute priority is Important at
all. Aside from the basic point that, ceteris paribus, it is always better
to respect the provisions of private contracts, there are at least two other
arguments. First, any discrepancy between what a class of claimants gets
inside bankruptcy and what it gets outside bankruptcy could lead to
inefficient rent—seeking ex post ——withsome people bribing management into
deliberately precipitating bankruptcy, and other people attempting to
forestall bankruptcy. Second, as Is shown in Hart and Moore (1990), the
seniority structure of a firm's capital provides an Important instrument for
containing management's ability to raise fresh capital; any arbitrary
419. Further Considerations
There are of course many details of our proposal still to be sorted out.
In this section, we briefly raise some ancilliary issues. We should stress
that we do not have definite answers to a number of questions. There may be
room for several answers, depending on the circumstances of the firm: indeed,
one can imagine firms opting for different choices, ex ante.
Ci) Claim disputes
We have taken the (optimistic) view that a judge could fairly quickly
decide on who is owed what, and in what priority ——saywithin three months.
This may be too optimistic.47 It can be argued that one advantage of a
Chapter 7 sell—off is that the receipts can be safely held in some
(interest-bearing) escrow account until such time as the conflicting claims
have been resolved. By contrast, If the firm is to survive as a going
concern, such delays could be fatal.
In practice, it aatters just how big a slice of the cake is in dispute.
If, for example, 90% of the prior claims can be decided upon within three
months, then the judge could proceed in the manner we have suggested, with
these 907. of claimants being allocated equity/options, and then voting. Any
cash that is generated ——eitheras part of the winning bid, or in the form
tampering with seniority rules within bankruptcy will typically reduce the
flexibility of this instrument.
47Douglas Baird suggests that much of a lengthy Chapter 11 proceeding can in
fact be devoted to this issue; see Baird (1992).of subsequent debt repayments/dividends ——isheld in an escrow account by
the judge pending a resolution of the outstanding 10% of claims, Once
resolved, successful claimants could be issued equity in the firm according
to the seniority and value of their claims, and the cash held in the escrow
accountcouldbe distributed appropriately. In short, the fact that certain
claims are in dispute need not hold up the bankruptcy proceeding.
(ii) Dominant voters
Left as it is, our proposal would be vulnerable to exploitation of the
minority by a dominant shareholder. Suppose that, just prior to the vote
being taken, someone ended up with more than half the shares. There are a
number of ways in which this person could abuse his voting power. For
example, he could Vote to accept an artificially low cash offer from a second
firm in which he had a large stake. Dr he could vote himself Into control,
and sell the firm's assets cheaply to the second firm.
This problem is of course not new: it is a potential problem for any
publicly traded company, and there exist laws to protect minority
shareholders (boards of directors have fiduciary responsibilities). Indeed,
under Chapter 11, minority creditors (within a class) need protection, in the
form of equal treatment. However, it seems clear that existing law would not
be able to protect minority interests under our bankruptcy procedure. The
procedure would need to be amended in various ways ——forexample, to
disallow voting by someone who has an interest in a bidder's firm. Another
possibility would be
43(1) to grant a suitably—sized minority of the shareholders the power to
veto any winning bid that is a non—cash bid (this would help prevent
a dominant shareholder from voting in a bad non—cash bid);
and (2) to insist that a cash bid can only be accepted If it is the highest
cash bid (this would help prevent a dominant shareholder from voting
in a bad cash bid).
(iii) Secured creditors
The issue here is the following: in bankruptcy, should the secured
creditors of a firm be allowed to seize collateralized property? At present,
U.S. bankruptcy law basically prevents such seizure, and we would not favor
it either, because it could lead to an inefficient dismantlement of the firm's
assets through a me—first grab.48
We envisage that in our proposal a secured creditor might be treated
much as he would be under present U.S. bankruptcy law. Namely, a trustee is
appointed to appraise the value of the collateral; let this amount be $S.
Suppose the level of secured debt is SD. On the one hand, if the debt is
oversecured (S >D),then the creditor is granted his full SD in senior debt.
On the other hand, if the debt is undersecured (S <D),then the creditor is
given only $S of senior debt; the remainder, $(D—S), is treated as unsecured
48Under present U.S. law, a secured creditor g be able to seize his
collateral if he can demonstrate that the property is not necessary for the
firm's reorganization and it is worth less than the amount he is owed; see




The viability of certain kinds of bankrupt firms (such as retail stores)
can crucially depend on management being granted debtor—in—possession
financing, whereby suppliers' credit is placed ahead of existing senior debt.
(This is often mentioned as an Important role played by Chapter 11.) There
is no reason why a comparable arrangement could not be used during the four
months' of our proposed bankruptcy process, with the judge's approval. In
addition, for the sake of continuity, it is probably desirable to allow
management to run the company during the bankruptcy process, under the
supervision of the judge (again, as in Chapter 11).
(v) Partial bids
We have tacitly assumed that the bids received are for the entire firm.
In fact, bids may be for parts of the firm. The problem then arises as to
how to deal with overlapping/inconsistent bids. Before a vote can be taken,
a menu of coherent options has to be assembled.
We think that there is no alternative but to leave the matter of
assembling "whole' bids in the hands of the judge and his appointed agents.
It may well be necessary to solicit supplementary bids for parts of the firm,
In order to package a whole bid. Although this seems messy, it should be
noted that a similar difficulty is faced In a Chapter 7 proceeding: how to
bundle/unbundle the assets of the firm so as to maximize cash receipts.
4510. Implementing the proposed procedure in Eastern Europe
In this section, we raise some basic questions concerning the
implementation of the above scheme in the context of Eastern Europe. Let us
stress the following: we envisage that our procedure would primarily apply to
the case of (subsequent) bankruptcy of new private or newly-privatized firms.
Nevertheless, as we shall argue at the end of this section, elements of our
proposal might be of use for the purpose of debt—restructuring and
privatization of large state—owned enterprises.
A first source of difficulty in implementing our (or any other)
bankruptcy procedure in East European countries lies in the insufficient
number of qualified lawyers and judges. However, unlike both Chapter 11 and
other systems outside the U.S. ,ourprocedure attempts to minimise the need
for lawyers by reducing the role of the courts to mainly supervisory
functions. No decision or arbitration concerning a firm's future needs to be
made by the courts as long as the bankruptcy procedure is followed by the
firm's creditors and shareholders; and therefore no particular expertise in
the firm's operations is required from either judges or lawyers.
In this respect, our procedure has the advantage of being potentially
enforceable using the existing judiciary system ——thatis, without having to
introduce bankruptcy courts run by specialized judges. But it should be
noted that the judge (or administrator) will need accounting skills in order
to determine who had what claims, and of what seniority, in the insolvent
firm. One solution during the transition phase could be for a
well—established accounting firm not only to perform this task, but also to
46allocate shares and options (Task B) and to supervise the process of
exercising options. Foreign accounting firms which already operate In
Eastern Europe could be used for this purpose.
As we have already noted in Section 7, outside experts could also be
employed to evaluate competing bids on behalf of shareholders/voters. This
may be particularly important in Eastern Europe, where, In the absence of
smoothly operating capital markets, shareholders may have no other means of
assessing non—cash bids. Without outside evaluations, Incumbent management
would enjoy a considerable advantage In being able to sell their own bids
to shareholders. Incumbent management would have more difficulty preventing
a nominated team of outside accountants from gathering information about the
firms assets than it would concealing the information from individual
shareholders. Accountants could also have an important role in ensuring that
outside bidders have access to information about the firm. And of course
there is very little that management can do to stop third parties from
putting up cash or non—cash bids.
In Section 8, we discussed some Simpler alternatives to Bebchuk's scheme
for allocating equity. In Eastern Europe, it might be highly desirable to
dispense with using Bebchuk's options, given the poor capital markets. Our
first alternative may be especially attractive: namely, once the bids have
been assembled, an outside expert (again, a foreign accounting firm?)
assesses them and estimates the value, m, of the best one; shares are then
allocated according to absolute priority, taking V5 as if it were the true
value of the firm; and finally a vote is taken among shareholders to decide
which bid to accept.
47One concern about the adoption of our procedure in Eastern Europe is
that the scope for making non-cash offers sight facilitate collusion among
managers of mutually indebted firms. This is a particular worry in the
current context, where inter—enterprise credits have substantially
proliferated since 1988. In such a context one could easily imagine the
possibility of several firms, with sizeable mutual debt obligations, becoming
simultaneously insolvent. The managers of these firms could collude by
making (and then voting in) non-cash offers which maintain the status quo --
therebyprecluding potentially more efficient investors or management teams
from winning. Incumbent managers would thus keep their jobs without any
monetary transfer being made, in particular to compensate minority security
holders.(The drawback here relative to a straight liquidation procedure
like Chapter 7 is that in the latter managers would have to be party to a
successful cash bid in order to keep their jobs. But, as we have argued,
Chapter 7 has serious limitations.) The kinds of devices we put forward In
Section 9(11) to reduce the power of majority voters may help eliminate
collusion too: for example, doubly—interested parties cannot participate in
the vote; or non—cash offers can be vetoed by a suitably—sized minority of
shareholders.
A further concern with isplementating our procedure in the current
environment of Eastern Europe is that it would burden state banks (which are
the main creditors of most large enterprises in the East) with
responsibilities in the reorganized companies, which they could hardly assume
given their bureaucratic management structures and methods. (State banks are
often unable to perform such operation as taking deposits, giving account
balances, transfering money, etc. ,letalone evaluating projects and
monitoring enterprises' managers. )Wehave little to say on this score. The
48commercialization and/or privatization of state banks would of course help.
as too would the setting up of adequate supervising instititlons such as
Banking Commissions. (These changes are urgently required as part of the
transition reform package anyway.) In addition, state banks could be obliged
to sell the bulk of their equity to the private sector within a limited time
period, say five years ——inorder to avoid the possibility that the
implementation of our procedure in the case of newly—privatized firms with
large state—bank creditors would merely lead to renationalizationl
State owned enterprises
-
Althoughour proposal was not conceived to deal with the case of
insolvent state—owned enterprises (SOEs), our work has spawned some further
proposals (notably by Van Wljnbergen (1992)) to deal with the difficult
problem of debt restructuring, commercialization and privatization of large
SUEs. A high concentration of economic activity still takes place in these
enterprises, which are frequently overburdened with debt obligations
inherited from the socialist system. These debt obligations concern a small
number of creditors, essentially one state—bank specialized in the
corresponding branch or sector, and a few trade creditors, consisting mainly
of other state—owned enterprises.
The case of SUEs with a unique creditor/owner (the state) is
comparatively easy to deal with in the sense that the state itself can
solicit cash and/or non—cash bids for such enterprises in order to prlvatjze
them.
49The case of SUEs with muitiple creditors is more delicate, as argued in
Van Wijnbergen (1992). Writing off the outstanding debts of these
enterprises would have the effect of decapitalizing their state—bank or trade
creditors, thereby adding to the financial difficulties of these latter
instititions; furthermore, such a debt write-off would leave no bonding
device in place to restrain the future behavior of management.
Van Wijnbergen proposes a mechanism which has several elements borrowed
from our procedure. The ides is first to determine a priority order of
claims; for example with the Finance Ministry (tax—collector) as the most
senior creditor, followed by the commercial banks, trade—creditors and
workers. Then ownership of the SUE would be transferred to the Finance
Ministry. The junior creditors would receive call options corresponding to
the priority order of their claims, em described in Section 5 above. The new
shareholders would then vote over cash end non-cash bids. Such a
privatization procedure has the merit of avoiding both the complications and
potential conflicts that might have otherwise arisen from the multiplicity
and diversity of state—sector claims over SUEs.
50Appendix
In this Appendix, we briefly look at what is happening now in two of
the countries of Eastern Europe ——Hungaryand Poland. Unfortunately, we
think that the bankruptcy procedures these two countries have adopted are
vulnerable to many of the criticisms that we have levelled against Chapter
11: e.g., bargaining among heterogeneous creditors is unlikely to be
efficient (in terms of time, legal fees, foregone Investment opportunities);
the creditors' representatives may not have the correct incentives; incumbent
management has too much power. Moreover, curtailing the length of the
procedure may precipitate too many inefficient liquidations.
Hungary
The new Hungarian bankruptcy law (enacted In September 1991) oblIges
the leadership of an insolvent company49 to design a rehabilitation program
for restoring solvency. Within 60 days from the beginning of the bankruptcy-
proceedings, the debtor must convene a 'compromise negotiation meeting among
representatives of the company's creditors. These representatives form a
Board of Creditors which ultimately decides either to accept or reject the
compromise agreement. Approval by all members of the Board who are present
is required for the rehabilitation plan to be approved and then ratified by
491n the case of state—owned enterprises, the leadership may consist of the
general assembly of employees or the founding organization. In the case of
private enterprises, It consists of the membership of the partnership or the
general asseisply of shareholders.
Althe court. In the absence of any agreement within 15 days, the court starts
a liquidation procedure which is similar to Chapter 7.
Poland
Whereas the Hungarian procedure provides a unified framework for
dealing with state—owned and private companies, in Poland there exist several
procedures to deal with insolvent firms.
The Law of State Enterprises (enacted in 1990) prescribed that if a
state owned enterprise sustained a substantial loss which exceeded its
reserve fund, and at the same time the main creditor bank refused to extend
credit, then the state owner/founding organization (local government, branch
ministry, ...)couldeither liquidate the enterprise or appoint a new
compulsory management. This new management is given two years to
rehabilitate the enterprise and thereby avoid its liquidation. Note that
such a procedure clearly discriminates against claimholders (banks, trade
creditors, etc.) who do not control the enterprise's parent agency. Also,
the criteria for deciding between liquidation and appointing new management
50
are left unspecified.
50A modification of this procedure for insolvent state—owned enterprises has
been adopted very recently by the Polish Parliament, allowing the enterprise
itself to initiate a process whereby the creditors would decide (only by
unanimous agreement) whether to restructure/reschedule the enterprise's debt
or to let the enterprise be liquidated.
In addition to the above procedures, the new Polish privatisation law enacted
in July 1990 provides for liquidations" which amount to the state leasing
the insolvent enterprise's assets to new companies.
A2For insolvent private firms, the Polish authorities have just
rehabilitated the old Commercial Code of 1934. Upon declaring the firm
insolvent, the relevant court appoints a trustee who supervises the property
andmanagementof the firm and also conducts settlement proceedings. To be
enforceable, any settlement must be approved both by the court and by a
majority of creditors representing at least 2/3 of the firm's debt
obligations.
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